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Russian law, this trend was conspicious in recent years, is moving away
from the acceptance of international rules in the domestic legal order.
In 2015 the Constitutional Court declared itself competent to decide on
whether a European Court of Human Rights judgment was in conformity
with the Constitution. Later that year legislative amendments entrenched
this approach, two Strasbourg judgments were denied execution. In July
2020 constitutional amendments extended this to all international judicial rulings and
arbitral awards.
Under this thick fog of isolationist rhetoric, however, lay areas where quite a different
attitude towards international rules thrives – one of overzealous implementation.
One of them is the combat against money laundering and, in particular, giving
effect to the Recommendations of Financial Action Task Force (FATF). A one-page
investigator’s decision referring to money laundering would be enough to conduct
over a hundred of searches across the country, freeze hundreds of bank accounts,
and introduce new regulations to implement FATF Recommendations so swiftly that
enforcement of ECtHR judgments pales in comparison. All of that is directed against
the political opposition with no meaningful international oversight.
During the summer of 2019 mass protests shook Moscow: people were on the
streets against the authorities’ decision to deny a number of independent candidates
access to the electoral ballot on the basis of alleged irregularities with the signatures
collected in the candidates’ support. During one of the bigger demonstrations, on 3
August 2019, the Investigative Committee announced the opening of an investigation
into money laundering committed by the leadership of the Foundation against
Corruption (known by its Russian acronym, “FBK”), a group led by Alexey Navalny
who is a major figure of the political opposition. The FBK conducts and publishes
anti-corruption investigations based on publicly available data, e.g. property
registers, public officials’ tax declarations etc. One of the major investigations
presented evidence of unexplained wealth of the former President and former Prime
Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev (“He’s not Dimon to You”).
The decision to open the investigation which was made available to the defence
was one page long, and only two short paragraphs dealt with the actus reus. As
it transpired from the decision, the FBK leaders were suspected of transferring
cash into the FBK accounts via ATMs. The decision failed to make even a cursory
mention of the predicate offence, i.e. the crime that generated the supposedly illegal
income. 
However unconvincing the decision to open the investigation into money laundering
was, it led to considerable consequences. After the election results were declared
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and it turned out that the candidates supported by Alexey Navalny obtained
almost half of the votes in Moscow and won elsewhere (e.g., in the Khabarovsk
governorship run-off), the homes and offices of the FBK staff in dozens of Russian
regions were searched on the same day of 12 September 2019. In total, over 100
searches were conducted, all with reference to the one-page decision of 3 August
2019. They all had been authorized by the rulings of the Basmanny District Court
in Moscow which just copy-pasted the two paragraphs from the decision to open
the investigation. The same text was again copy-pasted in over 200 rulings blocking
personal bank accounts of the FBK staff and other pro-Navalny activists. Searches
related to the 2003 case against Mikhail Khodorkovskiy are conducted in 2020 with
reference to the allegations of money-laundering. 
Anti-money-laundering prosecutions would normally be based on financial
investigations that follow the money flows and, thus, on the factual allegations that
are more detailed than half a page. Such allegations should also include data and
explanations as to the criminal nature of the money that was being laundered. In
this case the choice of the charges of money laundering against the FBK leadership
was likely preferred to any other in order to justify the prosecution internationally.
The reason is that the misuse of the charges of fraud against Mr Navalny had
already failed the test of the European Convention twice (Navalny and Ofitserov
v. Russia and Navalnyye v. Russia), but money laundering is an internationally
recognised evil against which all States should take measures, as required by
international conventions and international anti-money-laundering organisations.
Here the Russian authorities may have expected not the criticism but international
praise.
Russia is a member of three international anti-money-laundering organisations:
G7-founded FATF, Council of Europe’s Moneyval and the Eurasian Group (EAG)
dominated by Russia itself. Russia was reviewed by Moneyval in 2014 and by FATF
in late 2019. Both groups rated Russia as ‘largely compliant’ on most of the issues.
Importantly, the methodologies of both groups were focused on the insufficient
implementation of the anti-money-laundering recommendations, but not on the
overzealous enforcement or outright abuse for political purposes. This “blind spot”
in the analysis may, at least in part, be explained by the desire to identify and close
all the loopholes for an internationally acknowledged evil of money laundering and
terrorism financing. It may also be due to the fact that the review is conducted by the
officials in charge of combating money laundering in their home countries.
During the review Russia identified a potential field for the development of anti-
money-laundering regulations: cash donations to charities. In July 2020 the Ministry
of Justice published draft regulations on the matter. No judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights, or of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, or an
arbitral award has ever been implemented with comparable swiftness. 
The European Court of Human Rights was accused on more than one occasion
for acting outside any democratic control, not only by the likes of Daily Mail and
pro-Kremlin politicians, but, for example, by a senior Swiss judge. Yet, with all the
democratic deficit of European institutions, ECtHR judges are elected by members of
the Parliamentary Assembly which are, in turn, elected members of their respective
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national parliaments, and the ECtHR is more than attentive to the criticism from the
governments (not much so to that of practicing lawyers and human rights NGOs
though).
In contrast, FATF both operates without any supervision by any democratically
elected institution and has much more tangible impact on, for example, the
Russian legal system than the ECHR. FATF is not entirely deaf to this criticism
and started holding Private Sector Consultative Forums to consult with interested
parties other than not always democratically elected governments. One of
the recommendations of these forums was to enhance the participation of NGOs
concerned in the compliance reviews of the participating states. In 2019 UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism Fionnuala Ní Aoláin also called on FATF to
have regard to international human rights norms. However, as can be seen from the
2019 review of Russia, the FATF anonymous reviewers did not take that otherwise
reasonable suggestion on board.
Russia is not alone in the abuse of FATF Recommendations. Kyrgyzstan, which is
not even a FATF member, has recently adopted a law to impose further obligations
on NGOs. This new law will require reporting to the Ministry of Justice, Social
Benefits Fund, and to the Statistics Committee on top of the reporting to the tax
authorities and will also prohibit NGOs to contract individual entrepreneurs. The
MPs who sponsored the law publicly justified it as implementation of the FATF
Recommendation 8 on combating money laundering and financing of terrorism
through not-for-profit organizations. But rather than contributing to the prevention
of money laundering and financing of terrorism, this law will make the operation of
Kyrgyzstani civil society organisations more cumbersome and prone to abuse by the
all-powerful executive. 
FATF is not alone in being an international body which is not intended to restrict
human rights, but in practice the governmental actions under its mandate allow
for both abusing and internationally legitimating it (think Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, the “Shanghai Six”). Even if governments, especially the illiberal
ones, will not subject those bodies to democratic human-rights-oriented review,
wider public debate by the scholars and practitioners will shed light on the practices
previously uncovered. It may make at least some of those organizations sensitive to
the problem. After all, FATF was not created to be used by one political party in its
struggle for power against another.
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